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ABSTRACT 
The usual lessons drawn from East Asia's striking experience of health and fertility transition 
concern the efficacy of well-designed government programs catering to an existing or ideationally 
stimulated demand. An alternative interpretation sees the demographic change—and the uptake of 
services—as a byproduct of social and economic development together with, in some cases, 
strong government pressures. This paper probes more deeply into this experience, seeking to 
identify common features of development design and administration that underlay it and to derive 
lessons for policies elsewhere. The broad sequence entailed, initially, establishment of an 
effective, typically authoritarian, system of local administration, providing (sometimes 
incidentally) a framework for promotion and service delivery in health, education, and family 
planning. Subsequent economic liberalization offered new opportunities for upward mobility—
and greater risks of backsliding—but along with erosion of social capital and the breakdown or 
privatization of service programs. The study is mainly focused on seven countries: Taiwan and 
South Korea ("tiger" economies), Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia ("second wave" countries), 
and China and Vietnam ("market-Leninist" economies). The period is roughly from the 1960s to 
the 1990s.  
 
3The "East Asian miracle"—the several decades of extraordinary economic growth and 
poverty reduction in a group of East and Southeast Asian countries, beginning around the 
1960s—provides the gold standard of development achievement. The miracle also 
entailed rapid social development, in particular the transformation of demographic 
regimes from high to low mortality and fertility and a strong expansion in secondary 
education on top of near-universal primary schooling. Altogether, through some 
combination of good judgment and historical luck those countries got the settings right. 
Others should seek to learn from them how it was done. 
 The miracle is identified in this paper with the development experience of seven 
countries: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam, 
roughly from the 1960s to the 1990s. Some regional high-flyers are thus omitted. Japan, 
whose industrialization and demographic transition were well underway before World 
War II, lies in a different time frame; Singapore and Hong Kong, although good for the 
averages, are too distinctive in their roles as city-states and entrepôt ports, far removed 
from the populous agrarian states that made up most of the region as it emerged from 
wartime occupation and decolonization. The Philippines would once have been routinely 
grouped with Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, but its economic record—per capita 
income growth averaging 1 percent per year over 1965-1995—is no match for the others. 
(The Philippines is not one of the "high-performing Asian economies" that are the subject 
of the World Bank's much-cited report on the East Asian miracle—indeed it is hardly 
mentioned in it [World Bank 1993].) Table 1 presents the broad picture.1
Table 1: Economic growth and demographic transition in selected East Asian countries 
over a 30-year period 
 
Country 
 
Period 
Av. annual growth 
of GDP per capita 
(percent) 
Increase in life 
expectancy over 
period (years) 
Change in total 
fertility over perioda
(births per woman) 
The "tiger" economies 
Taiwan 1955-1985 6.2 11 - 4.6 
South Korea 1960-1990 6.9 17 - 4.3 
The second waveb
Thailand 1965-1995 5.4 10 - 4.2 
Malaysia 1965-1995 4.5 14 - 2.9 
Indonesia  1965-1995 4.1 19 - 2.8 
"Market-Leninist" economies 
China 1970-2000 4.9   9 - 4.1 
Vietnamc 1980-2000 4.3 12 - 2.8 
a End points taken as averages of estimates for the two neighboring intervals.  
b For the Philippines (1965-1995), the three right-hand columns would read 1.0 percent, 12 years, 
and  - 2.3 births.    
c 20 year period. 
Sources:  economic data: Maddison (2003); demographic data: United Nations (2005) and endnote 7 
(for China and Taiwan fertility). 
 
4On the economic side, the ingredients of this success and what the policy lessons 
of the experience are, and are not, have been vigorously debated, especially in the 
shorthand  terms of the relative significance of government and market. Some analysts 
assign the major determinative role to an interventionist state; others point to 
straightforward capital accumulation, physical and human, with a large role for private 
(including foreign direct) investment. The developmental state is pitted against the 
Washington consensus.2 There is no clear-cut victor: partisan declarations favoring one 
side often implicitly assume conditions, or borrow policy elements, characteristic of the 
other side, blurring the contrast. Reflecting this quasi-merger is the hybridized "post-
Washington consensus" strategy, with good governance a central feature and the hard 
edges of neoliberal economic orthodoxy softened by some concessions to managed trade 
and a social safety net. 
 
In explaining population change there has been a parallel debate between 
government and market, but referring to the behavior of workers and consumers rather 
than that of firms and entrepreneurs. Here, one side stresses the importance of state 
interventions affecting family and individual norms, attitudes, and behavior, notably 
through schools and health and family planning programs; the other side sees individual 
and family aspirations (and fears) as the critical element, with changes in family 
economic conditions, opportunities, and expectations giving rise to greater demand for 
education and health services and smaller desired family size. The "programmers"—those 
emphasizing the effects of government provision of services—are pitted against the 
"economists," for whom increased demands for health and family planning services are 
effects of economic growth and the cultural change that accompanies it—effects likely to 
translate into lower mortality and fertility with or without government action.  
 This population debate was also intense for a time but lost urgency as the 
demographic transition progressed. With little seemingly hinging on the matter, the need 
for resolution weakened. A compromise position gained increasing support, one that gave 
a place to both service supply and demand factors. But since each had plausible effects on 
the other, there was considerable latitude in estimates of the balance between the two.  
 Compromise, however, is a poor grounding for policy action. For high-mortality, 
high-fertility countries elsewhere, what mattered was that the East Asian experience gave 
at least qualified endorsement to the effectiveness of public-sector service provision. For 
schools and health clinics, that was hardly necessary: these services, for the most part 
centrally funded and administered, were well-established instruments of social 
development—accepted as routine responsibilities of government. Family planning 
services could be seen as a straightforward, if novel, addition to the array. The three 
together, construed as population policy, provided a clear-cut agenda for government in 
promoting demographic transition.  
 The portrayal of programmatic success was marred in one respect in the case of 
family planning. Their accomplishments notwithstanding, the region's programs were 
faulted by some observers for being target-driven and in a number of instances 
unacceptably authoritarian in their dealings with their (largely female) clients. In the 
program models adapted for use elsewhere these features had to be corrected: 
5authoritarian measures were to be firmly rejected, as was the whole notion of output 
targets; instead, programs were expected to emphasize service quality. This new 
perspective, endorsed in the 1994 Cairo Program of Action, shifted the fertility 
component of population policy away from what was portrayed as crude demographics 
and rebranded it as an aspect of women's reproductive health and freedom. Fertility 
decline could be achieved, even welcomed, but must not be blatantly intended. Implicit 
here was the presumption that the Asian success in fertility transition was not in part a 
product of that very authoritarianism. 
 Acceptance of a significant program role in fertility transition fitted well with 
another element of the consensus view of East Asian development. This was the positive 
feedback on economic growth that was held to derive from a rapid fertility decline, 
working through the additional resources for public and private investment freed up by a 
lowered child-dependency rate. Although long hypothesized on the basis of simple 
modeling, the relationship found supporting evidence only in the 1980s; since then it has 
attained the status of population-and-development orthodoxy, described in metaphor as a 
window of opportunity or a demographic gift or dividend. In some accounts it almost 
appears to be the lesson of the East Asian experience, economic and demographic: 
successful antinatalist measures provide a country with a limited period of low 
dependency during which it has the opportunity to ramp up investment; if it does not do 
so, the chance is lost.3
These are the terms in which East Asian development and demographic transition 
are generally understood, claimed to account (along with the good luck of a favorable 
external economic environment) for the region's remarkable performance. In looking for 
exportable lessons, however, broad prescriptions—increased investment, good 
governance, effective programs—even if well-founded, do not get us far; insights with 
policy substance must come from finer-grained levels of social reality. In the population 
case, what was it about the particular development paths that brought an early onset and 
rapid pace of demographic transition? Which government actions—institutional reforms, 
policies, programs—appear to have influenced outcomes at the grass-roots level, whether 
or not they were specifically aimed at demographic change, and through what means? 
How significant have been fortuitous historical circumstances, such as a country's 
institutional inheritance and the external economic and political environment? Such 
questions are taken up in this paper, with reference to the demographic transitions in the 
countries listed in Table 1.  
 My genre is casual empiricism, in the vein of what has been termed "forensic 
storytelling" (Lal and Myint 1996) or "analytic narrative" (Rodrik 2003). As with any 
discussion of historical change, outcomes are inherently overdetermined and the implicit 
counterfactuals used to call attention to particular lines of determination can always be 
contested. (If that were not the case, historians could deal once with a course of events, 
then pack up and leave.) My main focus is on rural society, demographically still 
dominant in the period of interest. The treatment is fairly schematic, skirting numerous 
complications—not least the matter of country heterogeneity. I roughly follow the two 
broad explanatory accounts mentioned above, looking first at the structural groundwork 
of social and administrative organization and the population-related programmatic efforts 
built on it, then at the process and effects of economic liberalization and expansion of 
6mobility options. Necessarily my account relies heavily on the country-specific analyses 
of others. 
 
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION: SECURITY AND CONTROL 
The basic tasks of public administration in developing countries are maintaining 
social order and organizing public finance, especially revenue collection. Building on that 
minimalist administrative structure, governments accumulate a wide variety of 
programmatic responsibilities in areas linked to social and economic development—as 
well as some assigned to them by little more than simple expectation, as being tasks that  
governments nowadays, even poor ones, are meant to undertake. The administrative 
system is often used also in less productive ways, such as securing the government's own 
political survival—a function that may spill over into generalized suppression of dissent 
or of unwelcome reformist activity—and wielding its authority to exploit rent-seeking 
opportunities. 
 Administrative systems vary in the space they allow for local organizations to 
operate as entities more or less independent of government control—organizations such 
as farmers' cooperatives, irrigation societies, women's associations, and other interest 
groups with actual or potential political agendas. The state's promotion and mobilization 
of such groups can be a source of dynamism in rural development; independently 
initiated collective action, on the other hand, may be seen as a threat. The extent of 
government influence on local organizational freedom of action ranges widely among 
countries and across substantive areas, as documented for the 1960s in the mass of 
comparative data assembled by Uphoff and Esman (1974).   
 For the seven countries identified in Table 1, attainment of a stable and secure 
administrative order can be roughly located at the beginning of their respective miracle 
growth decades. The situations can be sketched very briefly as follows.4
In Taiwan and South Korea, the legacy from half a century of Japanese rule 
included a rural administrative system designed around the colonial priorities of stability 
and surplus extraction (chiefly rice), along with high rates of landlessness and tenancy. 
Security concerns were paramount for their post-World War II governments, facing 
threats of invasion—and actual invasion in the Korean case—but there was also an urgent 
need to boost food production. The radical land reforms of this period contributed on 
both scores, transforming the agricultural sector in a very few years (1947-50 in Korea, 
1949-53 in Taiwan) from landlordism to owner-cultivation, a modern version of peasant 
proprietorship (Mason et al. 1980: 237-240, Koo 1968). 
 
In Korea, a coercive state apparatus was put in place in the 1950s under the 
Syngman Rhee dictatorship, but its wielding in the cause of rural development came only 
with the Park government (initially a military junta) in 1961 and with the creation, in the 
same year, of the Economic Planning Board. The vigorous, village-based community 
development program known as Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement) was 
introduced in 1971, and soon put under the Home Affairs Ministry. The Saemaul 
movement combined hierarchical government influence with community mobilization 
7around self-help initiatives, with the best-performing villages rewarded by the 
government. At its peak in the 1970s and 1980s it was an important instrument of social 
change. Unusually among community development efforts, it resisted capture by local 
elites. (Turner et al. 1993.) 
 In Taiwan, the mainlander KMT government imposed its authority down to the 
township level (an administrative unit averaging around 30,000 population) but ceded 
some political autonomy in local affairs to the majority indigenous Taiwanese through an 
elected local government, local assemblies, and farmers' associations (Burmeister et al. 
2001). In the Uphoff-Esman study (1974: 29-30), Taiwan differed from Korea in the 
greater relative importance of local organizations in rural development and in allowing 
more upward as well as downward communication in the administrative hierarchy. Both 
countries scored high on an index of rural security (protection from violence, access to 
justice), but Taiwan ranked much higher on indicators of political participation (pp. 48, 
56).  
 As in the tiger economies, security threats were also pervasive in postwar 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia—potential dominoes in the then plausible geopolitical 
scenario. In Malaysia, a sporadic Communist insurgency involving mostly rural ethnic 
Chinese petered out after independence (1957) and was declared ended in 1960, but the 
government's response (which included the forcible relocation of population in affected 
areas) left as a residue a strong civil administrative system backed by the sweeping police 
powers of the Internal Security Act. Rural development planning proved remarkably 
effective in this framework, notably in the close monitoring and comparative evaluation 
of development performance (Ness 1967). Government intrusiveness, however, did not 
extend to landownership and tenure issues. Under the New Economic Policy, in effect 
from 1971 to 1990, there was a major push to improve the conditions of rural Malays, a 
group that largely coincided with the smallholder class. Rudner (1983: 435) writes dryly 
of the "ethno-economic accounting" that evolved. The resettlement of landless people 
under the Federal Land Development Authority contributed to this objective.  
 In Thailand from the late 1950s and in Indonesia from the mid-1960s, a strong 
military presence in the countryside gave muscle to the civil administration, elevating the 
role of state over society and suppressing local political organization and dissent. In 
neither country was there redistribution of land, but nor was there an inherited pattern of 
large holdings. Although without a colonial administrative legacy to build on, Thailand's 
bureaucracy "which started out as a traditional Asiatic institution…steadily improved 
over the postwar decades to become one of the best outside East Asia" (Oshima 1993: 
246). Observers describe the state's cooptation of village leadership, its "hierarchical and 
non-participatory mode of action," and its practices of social surveillance (Hirsch 1990: 
228; Turton 1989: 66-67). Thailand took on the trappings of a developmental state: "Thai 
military leaders incorporated economic development as an integral part of their strategy 
to create stability and security" (Chai-Anan and Sukhumbhand 1993: 136). This was the 
setting in which the country's impressive rural development performance began. 
 In Indonesia in the 1950s and early 1960s the burgeoning Communist Party 
sought to organize the landless and land-poor into a radical agrarian movement, actions 
strongly opposed by other political forces, especially the Muslim parties, and by the 
8army. The tensions grew and came to a head in the final, economically chaotic years of 
Sukarno's presidency, ending in 1965 with army-backed mass killings or imprisonment of 
Communist Party members and supporters. Over the next two years Suharto's militarized 
and technocratic New Order government emerged, enforcing political quiescence and 
firming up the regional civil administrative hierarchy. Not only was that hierarchy 
heavily seeded with retired officers and NCOs, but close lateral ties were established 
between it and a parallel military hierarchy at each level (province, district, subdistrict). 
Leavening what otherwise might have been a fairly grim regimen of militarized control, 
the government then used this system to pursue innovative agricultural extension 
activities and to direct resources into education and local public works. (Hansen 1973; 
McNicoll and Singarimbun 1983.) 
 In China, the administrative structure put in place after the Communist victory in 
1949 reached down to villages with parallel and interlocked state and Party hierarchies of 
officials and cadres. Its Leninist trappings included both official and informal 
neighborhood surveillance, incessant meetings and indoctrination sessions, and 
household registration and restrictions on geographic mobility. However, establishment 
of a stable agrarian economy was continually deferred by the successive and increasingly 
radical reform efforts. A comprehensive land reform in 1950-52 was a kind of violent 
analogue to those of Korea and Taiwan, redistributing the holdings of landlords and rich 
peasants but leaving production decisions in the hands of households—albeit with 
increasing government intervention in marketing. Those changes might have given rise to 
a Korea-Taiwan-style smallholder farm sector, but any incipient stability on such a basis 
was disrupted by the collectivization measures of the mid-1950s, with the formation of 
village-level producer cooperatives and the suppression of most remaining private 
markets. In turn, this restructuring had barely gelled before the countryside was again 
roiled by further Maoist campaigns: communization in 1958 followed immediately by the 
Great Leap Forward, and, after recovery from the massive famine these produced, the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. Stability of sorts returned as the Cultural Revolution ebbed 
in the early 1970s and many of the functions assumed by the communes devolved back to 
villages. The wholesale, though technically incomplete, retreat from collectivization 
came in the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping's production responsibility system. The long 
and damaging Maoist detour finally yielded something close to a conventional East 
Asian-type landholding peasantry, with strong productivity incentives in place though 
beneath a still heavy-handed administration. The rural population, however, had in the 
meantime become two-thirds larger than in 1950. (Greenhalgh 1990; Lardy 1985.)  
 In Vietnam, the Communist regime in the North showed many formal similarities 
to China in Leninist administration, but the household economy was never as fully 
suppressed. Rural land reform began in the 1940s and collectivization (although with 
accounting units much smaller than China's communes) in the mid-1950s. After 
reunification in 1975, efforts were made to extend collectivization to the South. The 
resistance these encountered, their evident economic failure, and, no doubt, the precedent 
of China's reforms then underway soon led to a Dengist-style backtracking under the 
Second Five-Year Plan (1981-86), culminating in formal abandonment of collective 
farming throughout the country under the 1988 Land Law. As in China, privatization 
9meant assignment of use-rights rather than formal ownership, leaving scope for rent-
seeking by local cadres. (Kerkvliet and Selden 1998; Ravallion and van de Walle 2001.)  
 
In each of these seven cases, a period of political, social, and economic turbulence 
ended with the emergence of a comparatively stable rural social order with absent or 
curtailed landlordism and a measure of security of tenure. Legal ownership was still 
missing in the Communist states, but use-rights tended to solidify over time into de facto 
ownership, with holdings becoming heritable and rentable if not mortgageable. The 
emergent regimes were all authoritarian in varying degrees—China and Vietnam at one 
end of the range, Malaysia and Thailand at the other—and they showed varying paces of 
relaxation of government intrusiveness over time as agriculture lost its economic 
dominance, as urban labor markets expanded, and as consumer values spread. But in the 
security realm state control held firm, restricting political opposition and offering little if 
any scope for redress of claims against authority. Often, especially as they matured, the 
regimes sheltered a fair measure of arbitrariness, partiality, and corruption. Balanced 
against that, however, their pervasive presence and sheer muscularity probably served to 
deter uncountenanced crime against person and property. In comparison with much of the 
rest of the rural developing world, they contributed to an amelioration of the 
"environment of risk"—the term used by Mead Cain (1981), writing of South Asia—
offering comparative security of person and property and some predictability in relations 
with authority. In turn, these conditions enlarged the space for economic and 
demographic planning by families and individuals—albeit, in the Communist states, not 
until socialist policy failures set the stage for economic liberalization. Offsetting the gains 
for development, in a broader calculus, was a far less admirable record on human rights. 
 
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
These systems of local public administration were largely the province of Interior 
Ministries, in several cases backed by a hierarchy of military or state-party functionaries 
(forming, in the phrase of one observer, an exoskeleton of command [Emmerson 1978: 
83]). Such a framework  delivers social and political orderliness—its immediate 
purpose—and serves as a structure through which to coordinate the program initiatives of 
other, functionally specialized, line ministries. A development-minded state is concerned 
to pursue such programs for their own sake, though no doubt also recognizing that broad-
based development can help a government secure legitimacy and popular backing—
political capital needed even by authoritarian regimes. From a demographic standpoint, 
the functional areas of chief proximate relevance are health services (especially 
preventive and primary health care) and family planning. Education of course also has a 
major demographic influence; but at the secondary level that is mostly relevant here, it is 
the expansion of demand rather than its characteristics as a program that warrants more 
attention.  
 Preventive health measures—vaccination, control of disease vectors, improved 
public hygiene and sanitation, and the like—could directly engage local government and 
draw on a state's administrative strengths. Immunization against childhood diseases 
became routine; environmental cleanups helped to lessen parasitic infections. China 
10
probably took these measures furthest, through its National Patriotic Health Campaign 
Committees working under central political direction (Jamison et al. 1984: 37). But in the 
other countries—and, of course, more widely in the developing world—similar, if less 
forcefully pursued, campaigns meshed well with the capabilities and top-down attitudes 
of officialdom. For health outcomes, preventive measures offered a high payoff.  
 All seven countries also had systems of health care nominally reaching out to 
villages, even if the distribution of actual clinics was sometimes sparse and the bias in 
favor of urban, hospital-based services was strong. China during the Maoist years was 
known for its extensive and innovative use of paramedics. Backed by an egalitarian 
ideology, having no awkward political dimension, and facing no weakness in demand, 
the numbers of "barefoot doctors" increased from around 100,000 in 1957 to 1.5 million 
by 1965 (Parish 1985: 6). Under the Cooperative Medical Scheme, which by the 1970s 
covered most of the rural sector, the financing of China's rural health system was 
substantially devolved to the village (brigade) level (Gu and Tang 1995). The least 
effective rural health system of the seven countries was probably Indonesia's, where 
policies were set by a physician-dominated health ministry and implemented under 
largely indifferent Interior Ministry supervision. Fees from health center services made a 
significant contribution to local government revenues, but the expenditures that they 
financed went mainly to other activities such as public works (Achmad 1999: 171). 
Outside the Communist states, private health care services also played a significant role, 
especially pharmacies and midwives. Improving educational standards contributed to 
health outcomes by making for better nutrition, better hygiene, and more informed and 
more insistent client demands on service providers.  
 It is often assumed that family planning fits straightforwardly into the same 
"health-seeking" framework. In that view, demand for birth control—defined as demand 
at zero cost—already exists, openly or latently, and calls only for a minimally 
interventionist offer of (free) program services. That benignly therapeutic model, widely 
purveyed by international agencies, did not well describe many actual programs in East 
Asia. It came closest to doing so in the case of Taiwan, where the classic Taichung 
experiment of the early 1960s had imbued the national program with a wholly 
voluntaristic ethos (see Freedman and Takeshita 1969);5 Malaysia took a similar 
approach and soon discarded any antinatalist rationale for its activities (G. Jones 1990). 
But an authoritarian government was always likely to see a family planning program as 
one more development activity to which to apply its talents, resources, and operating 
habits. Quite likely, too, the potential clients of such a program—at the outset, villagers 
with limited scope for much exercise of individualism—would see the state's interest as 
not markedly more objectionable than many other government intrusions into daily life. 
On both sides, these inclinations departed from the prescriptions about reproductive 
rights spelled out in international conventions, but by and large they did not depart from 
them enough for that rights-based language to seem clearly belied. Only in the 
Communist states did official interference extend beyond the matter of contraceptive 
choice to actual fertility outcome. Korea, Indonesia, and China illustrate a progression of 
sorts in program intensity. 
 In Korea, family planning had been opposed by Syngman Rhee, but under his 
successor a major effort to introduce contraception was mounted under the First Five-
11
Year Plan of 1962. The Planning Board defined the program as an economic measure and 
gave it high priority. Abortion too was made readily available, despite its being 
technically illegal until 1973. As with its other mass programs, the government 
approached the contraceptive program "much like a military campaign" with detailed 
targets and monitoring of performance. The Saemaul movement became involved, further 
mobilizing potential clients through mothers' clubs and other activities. Over time, 
however, "the growing demand for contraceptive services removed much of the need for 
coercion" (Mason et al. 1980: 387-390).  
 A somewhat similar story can be told for Indonesia. Family planning was one of 
the priorities of the New Order government, and moved into high gear in the 1970s. Left-
wing opposition had been removed with the suppression of communism; right-wing 
opposition was deflected by skillful cooptation of Muslim political and religious leaders. 
Village officials, pressured to meet ambitious target numbers, were closely involved in 
recruiting program clients alongside staff of the Family Planning Board. While coercive 
tactics to gain acceptors were sometimes reported, so was enthusiastic participation by 
volunteer workers; moreover, the birth control methods purveyed by the program, unlike 
the case of China (and India), were reversible—abortion and sterilization were not a 
part—and the program measured its achievements by acceptance rates rather than birth 
rates. The details are well covered by Warwick (1986) and Hull and Hull (1997).  
 In China, client wishes in the matter were irrelevant. When state policy abruptly 
reversed itself in 1971 and declared that the birth rate must be brought down, an array of 
strong-arm measures was introduced in the form of the "later, longer, fewer" campaign. 
The same means that maintained political control—surveillance, indoctrination, 
sanction—were applied to regulate demographic behavior, and appeared to do so to 
remarkable effect, with fertility halved in less than ten years. Delayed marriage—the 
"later" part of the campaign—played a significant role, but so did abortion and 
sterilization in support of the other two parts. Then, in 1979, shifting to a still simpler 
demographic objective, the one-child policy was adopted. Overall, as Greenhalgh (1988: 
661) puts it, the government created circumstances in which the political costs to families 
of noncompliance outweighed the economic costs. Increasingly over time, however, 
couples sought ways around the dictates—"forming alliances with birth planning cadres, 
having illicit births, manipulating registers" (ibid.)—options that widened greatly over 
time as the program came to make more use of economic penalties and as migration 
prohibitions lost force.6 A broadly similar but less stringent version of the Chinese 
approach—a two-child policy—was put in place in Vietnam (Goodkind 1995).  
 Did the programs work? Certainly they did in proximate terms. That is, the 
program supplies and services found users, and birth rates dropped rapidly. Less certain 
is the answer to the more significant question bearing on causation: what would have 
happened to birth rates in their absence? With negligible births outside marriage, a rising 
female age at marriage was a major factor in fertility decline throughout the region, a 
familiar byproduct of educational and labor force changes and the ongoing cultural shift 
away from arranged marriage. Aside from campaign rhetoric, marriage age was treated as 
an explicit part of the birth control program only in China. Within marriage, the demand 
for birth control would likely have been affected by rising expectations of child survival: 
mortality declines were already well underway in the 1960s and 1970s. But it is highly 
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probable that the demand would have been met, though by less effective means, if the 
government's program had not been in the picture. Statistical efforts to investigate this 
counterfactual by separating out program effects from other plausible influences are 
notably unconvincing. Formal policy experiments, potentially more powerful, are rare: 
urban Taiwan (Taichung, mentioned above) and Matlab (rural Bangladesh) are the best 
known, the latter bearing most weight and showing distinct if modest impact. On the 
other hand, the programless but often rapid past fertility declines of many Western 
countries, or, nearer to hand, that of Burma, certainly do not suggest the necessity of 
organized family planning to bring about fertility transition. The familiar comparison 
between China and Taiwan does not even clearly confirm a stronger demographic effect 
of a coercive than a voluntary program: China's overall fertility trajectory, aside from 
plummeting and recovering during and immediately after the Great Leap years, roughly 
parallels the decline recorded in Taiwan—albeit at income levels far below Taiwan's.7
Nevertheless, most observers would probably agree that a strong-willed (if not 
strong-armed) and fairly competent administrative apparatus, promoting and delivering 
modern birth control methods, gave at least an initial impetus to fertility change. Many 
would also maintain that such an impetus would—and did—soon become redundant as 
burgeoning economic growth transformed the setting, creating new aspirations and 
opportunities. And by the 1990s, when the Cairo Agenda put target-based programs on 
the defensive, fertility transition in much of the region was already well on the way to 
completion.  
 
ASPIRATIONS AND OPPORTUNITY 
Studies of the East Asian economic miracle, however divergent in other respects, 
are agreed in emphasizing government roles in establishing conditions favoring 
investment. Primarily, the investment this proposition refers to is in production for 
export: manufacturing, mining, forestry, and plantation agriculture.8 In these sectors, 
"favorable conditions" entail satisfying a relatively small contingent of major players: 
domestic and foreign corporate leaders, entrepreneurs, and financial institutions. This 
concentration does not of course mean that what happens elsewhere in the economy and 
society is inconsequential, but it may lessen its importance in an accounting-type 
explanation of economic growth where there are other sources of investment funds 
besides the savings or taxes of households. Those other sources often existed. Thus, at 
crucial early stages of development, the high levels of US and Japanese investment in 
much of the region, initially in Korea and Taiwan, of revenues from rubber, tin, and 
palm-oil exports in Malaysia, of a surge of foreign assistance, the OPEC-linked windfall 
rise in oil rents, and logging exports in Indonesia, and of Japanese, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwanese investments in China were important parts of the East Asian story.  
 As dualistic growth theory teaches and as attested by much development 
experience, the smallholder agricultural sector can also be a major source of an investible 
surplus as productivity rises above subsistence levels. Attaining much-needed 
productivity gains in agriculture was a justification for the region's land reforms and for 
many subsequent extension programs. Fortuitously, these latter programs could draw on 
the new technology of the Green Revolution, which for rice saw its heyday in the 1970s 
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with the distribution of newly developed high-yielding varieties and the complementary 
inputs of synthetic fertilizer and pesticides that they required. A more productive 
agriculture is likely to employ fewer workers, contributing to the reallocation of labor to 
other sectors.  
 For demographic change, it matters greatly how the agricultural surplus is 
extracted—whether, for instance, by forcible purchase at low prices (as in China) or 
directed through private-sector intermediaries (as in Taiwan). The method of extraction 
affects two factors of central importance for fertility and migration decisions: aspirations 
and opportunity. Thus, in the Taiwan case, the intersectoral financial linkage drew the 
rural population into the overall development equation: the relevant production and 
investment decisions for the economy were not merely those of a few key actors but of a 
legion of family enterprises and middlemen, now with newly expanded horizons. 
Forcible extraction, on the other hand, goes with continued low ambitions and 
expectations.  
 Aspirations for upward economic mobility (or, nearly equivalently, for avoidance 
of downward mobility) are near to being an innate human characteristic. Where they 
appear to be absent, the reasons can typically be traced to the authority structure of the 
surrounding society, which may routinely foreclose mobility opportunities—over time, 
perhaps, producing the kind of seeming passivity that was once taken as a hallmark of a 
peasantry. As decades of experience with rural development have shown, any such 
passivity quickly vanishes in the face of genuine options for economic improvement and 
favorable risk-return ratios.  
 The same kind of mobility aspirations can also be seen as the central force 
underlying fertility transition. This proposition has been entrenched in the demographic 
literature for more than a century.9 For modern-day East Asia the clearest analysis of the 
topic is contained in Susan Greenhalgh's treatment of fertility transitions in Sinic 
societies (China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea)—see Greenhalgh 
(1988). The relationship involved is not susceptible to formalization in the manner of 
Beckerian household economics, which relates how changing opportunities and prices 
facing the household elicit shifts in effort- and time-allocation among members, including 
adjustments that entail or lead to reductions in fertility. A transformation of family size 
intentions and behaviors does not require actual economic achievement, merely the 
existence of realistically accessible mobility paths. In those circumstances, motivation at 
the individual level can be taken for granted. Actual mobility may be impeded by any of 
a wide range of possible obstacles located in the surrounding society, ranging from 
pressures on the individual emanating from the family or local community to corrupt or 
capricious government.10 
The most promising mobility paths in East Asian countries in this period—
modern sector employment—required education beyond the primary level (primary 
schooling was already becoming close to universal in the 1960s); for women, 
postponement of marriage—in particular, avoidance of early, arranged marriage; and, for 
most people, participation in the urban labor market.  
 The strong demand for secondary education is reflected in informal fee-based 
rationing in public systems and expansion of private schools. In Korea, private 
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expenditures—mainly fees to private schools and items such as "voluntary" parental 
contributions to public schools—are estimated to have made up around two-thirds of total 
school expenditures over 1966-75 (Mason et al. 1980: 349-352). In 1970s Indonesia, 
achievement of mass elementary education shifted competition to high school entry, 
typically seen as a route to a hoped-for government job (McNicoll and Singarimbun 
1983: 82). In post-Cultural Revolution China, the senior secondary level—non-
compulsory—was the choke-point, demanding sizable fees. A growing private-school 
sector has provided a second-track option alongside the public schools. (Thøgersen 1987; 
Liang 2001.) In Vietnam, similarly, there has been a rapid expansion of semi-public and 
fully private secondary schools, with enrollment rationed by the costs to parents. By the 
1990s, the state accounted for much less than half of all post-primary educational 
expenditures. (Nguyen 2002: 9-11.) For the seven countries, the enrollment outcomes are 
seen in Table 2: a doubling or more (in Indonesia, a trebling) in secondary enrollment as 
a proportion of the relevant age cohort in the period 1965-1980, and continuing if slower 
rises in later years.11 (Thailand, curiously, was a laggard on this score prior to the 1980s.) 
The gender imbalance against girls was steadily diminished over the period, almost 
disappearing in the 1990s (Knodel and Jones 1996). 
 
Table 2. Proportion of age cohort enrolled in secondary 
schools,  1965,  1980,  1995, selected East Asian countries 
Country 1965 1980 c.1995
Taiwan n.a. 80 97
South Korea 35 76 96
Thailand 14 25 48
Malaysia 28 48 64
Indonesia 12 42 56
China 24 63 70
Vietnam n.a. 47 55
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, various years;  
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators, various years (Taiwan). 
If parents saw secondary education as increasingly needed for their children—as a 
path to occupational security and status, even if job prospects were in fact slim (in the 
1970s, further attenuated by the large relative size of the 1950s birth cohorts then 
entering the labor market)—and if schools were costly, even those that were nominally 
publicly funded, there was a strong incentive for parents to restrict their family size. For 
such a relationship, an exception to support if not to prove the rule is the Malaysian 
policy adopted in the 1970s to upgrade Malays' relative position in the economy vis à vis 
the ethnic Chinese by, among other measures, offering them generous educational 
benefits and opportunities for public-sector employment. Gavin Jones (1990) largely 
credits this policy with the stalling of Malaysia's fertility decline (a total fertility rate of 4 
in the late 1980s, well above that of much poorer Indonesia), a phenomenon restricted to 
the Malays alone.  
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 Secondary schooling is inconsistent with very early marriage. Although this 
practice was much less prevalent in East than in South Asia, the proportions of women 
married in the age group 15-19 were relatively high in 1960s Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Between then and the 1980s, this proportion fell from 37 to 9 percent in Malaysia and 
from 40 to 19 percent in Indonesia (Leete and Alam 1993: 24). 
 For rural dwellers economic mobility often requires geographic movement: short- 
or long-term cityward migration or the commuting access to the urban labor market 
allowed by improving transport options. The first of these is captured in the census-based 
data on residence that underlie Table 3. The time at which the rural population actually 
starts to diminish is determined by its rate of natural increase as well as by the pace of 
urban migration. The regional variation in this timing, shown in the column marked peak 
year, is striking, given the similarities in demographic transition experience across these 
countries. It occurred in the 1960s in Korea and Taiwan, in the 1990s in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and China, and may not occur until after 2010 in Thailand and Vietnam.   
 
Table 3. Rural population growth rates, 1960s–1990s, peak year before 
(actual or projected) rural shrinkage, and average urban growth rate, 
selected East Asian countries 
 
Rural growth rate (% per year) Country 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Peak 
year
Average urban 
growth rate (% per 
year), 1965-1995
Taiwan 0.2 - 1.0 - 1.4 n.a. 1967 4.0    
Sth Korea 0.5 - 1.4 - 3.8 - 1.6 1967 4.5
Thailand 2.9 1.7 1.3 0.9 2012 3.4
Malaysia 1.9 1.0 1.1 - 0.2 1994 4.6
Indonesia 1.9 1.6 0.7 - 0.4 1993 4.7
China 2.2 1.6 0.4 - 0.2 1992 3.8a
Vietnam 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.2 2017 3.1b
a 1970-2000 b 1980-2000 
Sources: United Nations (2005); Selya (2004: 83); Population Statistics, Taiwan-Fukien Area.
A heavily urban-biased economy or one characterized by enclave dualism with 
high-productivity and highly capitalized primary industries can show overall economic 
growth despite the existence of an impoverished rural population. In those circumstances 
migration is an obvious exit strategy for rural dwellers, who can move at least to the 
fringes of the cities to be in a position to make some claim on the urban economy. (A 
land frontier, where one still exists, is an alternative, if usually less popular, destination 
for outmigrants.) The resulting demographic transition is then essentially an urban 
phenomenon. It is not at all mysterious—there are straightforward, largely economic 
reasons for urban fertility and mortality to be low—but it is not what is distinctive about 
the East Asian transition. An urban-centered transition is closer to the stereotype of the 
Latin American case.12 
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 The government administrative systems and the development programs they have 
supported are soon overtaken and sidelined in importance by changes in the wider 
economy and society. In much of the region, this happened smoothly as the private 
economy expanded into areas where government services had formerly been dominant. 
Free health services, free education, and free family planning were gradually replaced by 
fee-for-service, as marketization of the economy gained ground and as central 
governments found they could offload their former obligations on to regions, localities, or 
private citizens. (More pathological cases also involved out-of-control official rent-
seeking or corruption, although the main arenas for "crony capitalism" were the industrial 
and resource sectors.) But the effects of economic liberalization were more sharply felt in 
China and Vietnam. Public-sector health care systems were particularly vulnerable, 
showing rapid deterioration as market reforms spread. "In the early 1980s," Blumenthal 
& Hsiao (2005) write, "China virtually dismantled its apparently successful health care 
and public health system overnight, putting nothing in its place." Health expenditures by 
the central government plummeted, leading to the widespread privatization of health care 
facilities; local-level risk pooling under the Cooperative Medical Scheme largely ceased 
(ibid.). In Vietnam, a recent report notes that "health services are increasingly delivered 
by a public 'shell' filled by 'private sector providers'" (Wescott 2003: 25).   
 
DISTILLATION OF THE EAST ASIAN TRANSITION EXPERIENCE 
The seven countries I have drawn my illustrations from are East Asia's prominent 
successes in development performance and demographic transition, aside from Japan and 
the city-states. The addition of China and Vietnam to the usual mix is important in 
pointing to the substantial commonalities in societal development that exist across the 
group beneath the obvious political contrasts. They do not of course exhaust the range of 
economic and demographic experience in the region, but together they portray East Asia's 
dynamism and characterize it to the rest of the world.13 In terms of demographic 
transition, the experience can be encapsulated in a short series of propositions.   
Establishment of an effective system of public administration at the local level providing 
the rural population some assurance of physical security and predictability. The outlines 
of such a system are part of the institutional inheritance of any agrarian society, most 
commonly a tradition of authoritarian rule directed mainly at revenue collection. That 
legacy does not, of course, guarantee effectiveness, even for the limited aims of imposing 
political quiescence and extracting a surplus. Just as likely is an inheritance of pervasive 
insecurity deriving from corruption, social predation, and capricious administration, 
skewing the incentives facing families and harming productivity.14 Development- and 
security-minded East Asian governments, however, seized the opportunities for 
administrative renovation that opened in the aftermath of war or major civil unrest to firm 
up local government. Over time, rent-seeking by officialdom creeps back in, but the 
system plays a crucial role only for a comparatively short period—perhaps no more than 
a couple of decades. 
Extremes of rural inequality, where they existed, are ameliorated by land reform. A de
facto system of peasant proprietorship, even one at a kulak level with still-large numbers 
of landless workers, offers both the likelihood of social stability and, with appropriate 
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knowledge and resource inputs, rapid productivity increases and enhanced savings. Land 
reform, however, may have mattered less for the gain in equity it produced (yielding the 
famous though politically innocent dictum of growth-with-equity to describe the East 
Asian economic model) than for removing a reactionary rural elite able to block change 
or capture new resource inputs. An important feature of the East Asian miracle 
economies, emphasized by Haggard (2004: 72), is the extent to which political elites 
enjoyed "political, organizational, and economic independence from private sector 
actors" in the early growth phase. (For Indonesia at least, that phase did not last long.)  
The local administrative system is used to coordinate and give back-up support to the 
programmatic functions of line ministries, especially in the areas of health, education, 
and family planning. Service provision in health and education was initially strongly 
dirigiste, even if some of the funding for it was locally raised or fee-based. Demand for 
clinical health services can usually be taken for granted, but less so for preventive health 
measures. (Demand is irrelevant for many public health campaigns, which draw directly 
on administrative competence and may require little else.) Softness in the demand for 
education reflects the opportunity costs of child labor as well as some direct costs even 
when it is nominally free. And demand for family planning through a government 
program may be weak for any of a range of reasons, not least because of deficiencies in 
the services offered. In such cases local officials and community leaders can be drawn on 
to help with outreach, whether enforcement—as with vaccination campaigns—or with 
mobilizing a potential client base. Mobilization activities can easily and often do yield 
departures from the conventionally voluntaristic model of service delivery. 
The spread or explicit adoption of market-oriented policies creates a starker and more 
competitive economic environment for families and individuals. Such an environment 
offers families and individuals greater opportunities for advancement and greater risks of 
downsliding. Social capital erodes as investment goes instead toward physical and human 
capital. As market forces spread into the public sector, extension services are financially 
squeezed. Formerly free or nearly free health services decay or are transformed into fee-
for-service arrangements. Similarly, the share of schooling costs borne by parents 
through formal and informal payments rises substantially, especially at the secondary and 
higher levels.  
As new routes of economic mobility emerge, competition for places in secondary 
education intensifies, giving rise to formal and informal price rationing of access. 
Secondary and higher education are seen as increasingly necessary for modern-sector 
employment, for both sexes, creating a cost-squeeze on parents. A byproduct of these 
competitive pressures is a heightened demand for birth control. Improved educational 
outcomes yield further gains in health. 
Expansion of the modern industrial and service economy and the urban informal 
economy, together with induced productivity gains in agriculture, generates a large-scale 
reallocation of labor out of agriculture and out of the rural sector. This is the standard 
pattern of dualistic economic growth. The rural population eventually starts to shrink, 
beginning earlier at young-adult ages. Increased public-sector transfers, such as 
infrastructure funding, private urban-to-rural remittances, and greater commuting access 
to the urban labor market gradually lessen the rural-urban economic divide and with it the 
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rural-urban contrast in demographic patterns. Consumer goods and consumerist values 
and aspirations become widespread. 
Positive feedbacks from lowered fertility include human capital deepening. The 
significance of the Coale-Hoover effect of fertility decline on savings may be 
questionable (at a minimum, hedged about with side-conditions), but smaller families are 
more certainly linked to health and educational benefits for children—thus to a deepening 
of human capital.  
 
QUALIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS 
In the discussion above I have not sought formal causal relationships—even if 
that were feasible on a subject of this nature. Rather, I have looked for commonalities of 
experience, whether in circumstances or policy design, that seem to characterize this 
significant episode in global demographic history. Those that I have pointed to cannot be 
claimed as either individually necessary or collectively sufficient in bringing about 
demographic transition, but are apparent contributors to it—and, as such, worth close 
attention in other situations.  
 In all seven countries some combination of security, educational opportunity, and 
mobility possibilities has been present, along with a significant and more-or-less 
authoritarian government role. Aside from the last element, that of course is not much 
different from the classical view of the factors behind demographic transition. But the 
new pattern is distinctive. Moreover, the sequence matters. Administrative order and 
effectiveness came first, with economic growth and social development emerging out of 
that setting, essentially by "getting institutions right." Neither the early statism nor the 
later liberalism seems to be dispensable: the first, if prolonged or excessively predatory, 
would stifle economic growth; the second, if alone, would yield a more disorderly and 
urban-centered transition. Government programs, in this interpretation, are part of the 
story but not its main thread. Administrative effectiveness transfers to programmatic 
effectiveness—programs that can engineer an early mortality reduction through public 
health and clinical extension services and that can promote birth control up to and 
sometimes beyond the demand for it.   
 Among the East Asian countries not in the Table 1 group, the most interesting 
contrasting case is the Philippines. Not quite a success—far from it by many economic 
criteria—it is also not at all a Burma-scale failure: it was, for instance, an early and 
impressive achiever in health and education. A study of the political economy of 
demographic change that compared the Philippines with Indonesia or Thailand would be 
enlightening. Plausibly, the same entrenched elite interests that slowed Philippine 
agrarian reform were responsible for the country's missing the manufacturing export 
opportunities that were seized so decisively by its neighbors. In its meshing of private-
sector actors and political elites in this crucial period, the characteristic referred to above, 
the Philippines stands clearly apart from the Table 1 countries. Desultory economic 
performance in turn would account for the relatively slow pace of fertility decline 
(countrywide total fertility was still above 3.5 in the late 1990s).15 
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 For the East Asian Communist states the conventional expectation, by no means 
assured, is that market Leninism will continue to evolve toward greater political freedom. 
Part of that trend would be recognition of an enlarged private sphere, with the state 
relinquishing the residual influence it has retained over demographic behavior, especially 
over total fertility. Freedom in this domain has some arbitrary features in the modern 
West (witness the debates over new reproductive technology, and even over marriage), 
and the evident societal interest in the size and upbringing of the next generation may see 
new efforts to influence outcomes. In China, although an eventual diminution in 
population size may not be unwelcome, a desire to limit the pace of decline might argue 
for retention of some direct public influence over fertility. And issues of sex selection 
and, more broadly, eugenic choice could further complicate the course of liberal 
evolution in this arena.  
 This raises the delicate matter of whether a lesson of the East Asian transition 
might be the limited importance of political freedom as a contributor to it. The 
proposition does not, of course, extend to the explicit coercion that has underlain the 
population policies of China and Vietnam, but does include the authoritarian approaches 
seen elsewhere in the region as economic development got underway. Rapid economic 
growth was attained, initially at least, in highly disciplined settings. Such settings do not 
ensure policy competence but might amplify it where it exists. Here they appeared to play 
a role in effective delivery of health, education, and family planning services. Democracy 
is not even necessarily good for poverty reduction, as evidenced by comparisons with, 
say, India or the Philippines. (The once-common India-China comparison, in which India 
is depicted as democratically muddling through but China is condemned for its Maoist 
disasters, sidesteps the more interesting counterfactual of an India that had an other-East 
Asian kind of polity from the time of independence.)  
 A related point is the absence of support East Asia's experience gives to the Cairo 
Agenda, notwithstanding that the darker aspects of that experience contributed to the 
gathering voices that produced the Cairo Plan of Action. East Asia's policies were 
essentially pre-Cairo: demographics were their raison d'être. Thus they cannot be 
adduced in support of the efficacy of a focus on reproductive rights: that came later and 
in one or two cases has yet to arrive. It is striking that the abandonment of demography at 
Cairo came just at the time when East Asia was beginning to be paraded, whether rightly 
or not, as a showcase for the power of a demographic dividend. 
 I have mentioned, but not made much of, fortuity: the accident of being in the 
right place, at the right time, and, perhaps also, with the right ancestry. Geography is a 
newly rediscovered factor in development thought—now drawn on, for example, to 
explain Africa's predicament.16 Clearly geopolitical circumstances—the Cold War, most 
evidently—contributed to East Asia's emergence as a dynamic economic region in the 
later twentieth century. The end of the Korean War, the suppression of Indonesia's 
Communist Party, and the North's victory in Vietnam each ushered in comparative 
political stability. Favorable commodity prices and trade expansion that did not encounter 
major barriers helped too.  
 Ancestry is a trickier matter. What has been inherited is most broadly described as 
culture. Demographers have not fared well in treating cultural explanation—when they 
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do so, they attract the scorn of anthropologists. In development studies, "Asian values" is 
a culturalist term in heavy disfavor, a weak apologia for authoritarian rule that was 
advanced, often, by the rulers themselves. Caldwell (1993: 304) steps on this treacherous 
ground when he writes of family planning programs as "a manifestation—almost a 
cultural one—of the Asian arc from India through South-East Asia to China and South 
Korea." I have preferred to stick to administrative systems and to relations between the 
state and the individual—patterns that are also in some measure inherited, with some 
staying power and resilience, but with a comforting amount of tangibility, even if at base 
they too reflect culture.     
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In retrospect, lost opportunities are easy to identify. The development experience 
of the East Asian states that found the right policy path earliest could have been mined 
for lessons to inform the others; cautionary tales of policy failure could similarly be 
transmitted. But that is not how the world works. Except in rare political circumstances a 
country cannot free itself from the legacy of past action, along with its ideological 
premises and the constituencies its action has elicited, to see problems afresh and 
contemplate radical policy overhaul. International agencies, providers of distilled policy 
experience, have analogous path-dependent constraints.  So China's policy calamities and 
Indonesia's political impasse delayed serious development in those countries by a couple 
of decades, quite aside from the human suffering they brought. Further afield, Nehru's 
soft state and dirigiste policies yielded for several decades the notorious "Hindu rate of 
growth." These were not only lost years for energizing those economies but periods 
during which demographic expansion proceeded apace, environmental problems 
mounted, and the virtuous circles that accompany demographic transition remained 
unrealized.  
 There is some weariness in our profession with debates about demographic 
transition. They are seen as 1980s stuff, irrelevant for practical purposes now that fertility 
declines are underway almost everywhere. In terms of policy, the debates were 
supposedly settled by the Cairo consensus. But the East Asian experience still has much 
to offer other regions, beyond those elements of its family planning programs that found 
so much disfavor at Cairo. It has relevance especially for sub-Saharan Africa, where 
recent writing on the region's development problems is couched almost wholly in terms 
of development targets for 2015 and, perhaps in consequence, displays a striking absence 
of a discernible demographic dimension. Targets imply programs and programmatic 
thinking. While those have their place, I have argued that the more significant lessons of 
East Asia have to do with the effectiveness of public administration and the local 
opportunity structures that it fosters. Getting those local institutions right not only 
directly promotes demographic transition but has an important if ordinarily less-than-
miraculous economic payoff as well.   
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NOTES 
1 Miracles are time-limited. For Thailand and Indonesia, the period of rapid economic growth came to a 
sudden halt in the aftermath of the 1997 regional financial crisis, which affected those economies with 
particular severity. The recovery was slow, especially in the case of Indonesia. Note that while Maddison's 
(2003) income series (in "Geary-Khamis dollars"), drawn on in Table 1, are widely used in comparative 
analysis, they sometimes differ appreciably from the World Bank's purchasing-power-parity estimates. As a 
regional example, Maddison has Indonesia overtaking the Philippines in per capita GDP in the 1980s, 
falling back after 1997, but still ahead in 2000. World Bank estimates, in contrast, do not show the 
crossover and put Philippine income about 50 percent above Indonesia’s in 2000 (World Development 
Indicators, various years).  
 
2 Developmentalism, originally an interpretation of Japan's post-1945 experience with industrial policy, is 
now a term applied to countries as dissimilar as Brazil and Finland  (Woo-Cumings 1999). The Washington 
consensus refers to the neoliberal economic policy "package" (trade liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization, fiscal policy discipline, flatter taxes, and the like), supposedly pushed on developing 
countries by the IMF and some other international agencies. The term has now often blurred into an anti-
globalization cliché. 
 
3 For statements of (and reservations about) this argument, see, among other recent contributions, Mason et 
al. (1999). 
 
4 Part of the account referring to Indonesia and Thailand draws on material presented in McNicoll (1997). 
 
5 The Taichung experiment demonstrated a substantial uptake of birth control methods proffered by 
fieldworkers in an urban setting with existing demand (and appreciable past use), and the power of social 
networks to spread information about those methods more widely.  
 
6 For an illuminating early-1990s case study of such negotiations, illustrating the increasing strength of 
"weapons of the weak" in circumventing birth planning dictates and the ambivalent role of village-level 
cadres, see Zhang (1999). 
 
7 The total fertility rate trajectories are shown in the chart below (data sources: China: Banister [1987: 
230]; Feeney and Yuan [1994: 387]; US Census Bureau's International Data Base. Taiwan: Department of 
Health statistics cited by Selya [2004: 133-134]): 
 
8 Productivity gains have contributed to the growth outcome along with capital accumulation, but the 
evidence from sources-of-growth decompositions suggests that the latter has dominated. The balance 
between the two remains a point of controversy: total factor productivity is played up by Bauer (2001), 
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downplayed by Bhagwati (2000). The real miracle in East Asia, says Bhagwati (2000: 30), is "the 
phenomenal rise in private investment rates on a sustained basis." 
 
9 See, for instance, the writings of  John Billings, Arsène Dumont, Frank Fetter, E. A. Ross, and F. W. 
Taussig—all of them in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—or, more recently, J. A. Banks 
and Judith Blake. (Excerpts from many of the relevant items have been reproduced in the Archives section 
of Population and Development Review.)  
 
10 A forceful depiction of incipient development continually being snuffed out by predatory authority, 
drawing on diverse historical instances, is given by E. L. Jones (1988).  For China itself, in the decade or so 
following the Cultural Revolution, what was initially a policy-driven  fertility transition plausibly became a 
regime of entrenched low fertility governed largely by the mobility-fertility link. (The forcefulness of the 
one-child policy in its early years, however, suggests that the government believed that fertility was then 
below its "wanted" level.)  
 
11 Enrollment data, mostly compiled by UNESCO, suffer major accuracy and comparability problems, so 
the figures in Table 2 should be taken as rough indicators only. 
 
12 At the onset of their fertility transitions, Brazil was over 50 percent urban, Colombia nearing 60 percent, 
and Mexico around 65 percent. The equivalent urban fractions for the Table 1 East Asian countries were in 
the range 15-30 percent. (United Nations 2005; Selya 2004: 83.) 
 
13 East Asia has its prominent failures too: Burma, which has shown decades of economic stagnation under 
both the soft-state rule of the "Burmese way to socialism" and the current military dictatorship; the distant 
laggards of Laos and Cambodia; and North Korea, a far outlier on almost any dimension of political 
economy. Such experience need not preclude fertility decline: according to the Population Division's time 
series (United Nations 2005), Burma's fertility roughly halved over 1970-2000; North Korea's, never high, 
was about 2.0 by 2000. The case of the Philippines, a more instructive comparison than these, is discussed 
briefly below. 
 
14 A competing source of security is sometimes to be found in kin- or patronage-based groupings. 
Typically with a fluid fringe-membership, these lack the formal accountability of corporate communities 
and local public administration but may act to subvert territorial social organization. (On the problem of 
kinship undermining territoriality—one that confronts many African states especially—see Hyden 1990.) 
 
15 The Catholic Church's stance against birth control practice and programs, often invoked to explain the 
sluggish Philippine fertility transition, would arguably have been powerless in the face of rapid economic 
growth. 
 
16 The Commission for Africa, in its report for the G-8 meeting in July 2005, boils down the drivers of 
development to "governance and geography" (Commission for Africa 2005: 215). 
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